

**CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE
ON DISARMAMENT**

PRIVATE

ENDC/PV.68

10 August 1962

ENGLISH

THE UNIVERSITY
OF MICHIGAN

FEB 6 1963

DOCUMENT
COLLECTION

FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE SIXTY-EIGHTH MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Friday, 10 August 1962, at 10 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. de ARAUJO CASTRO

(Brazil)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:

Mr. de ARAUJO CASTRO
Mr. de ALENCAR ARARIPE
Mr. JANOS LENGYEL

Bulgaria:

Mr. M. TARABANOV
Mr. N. MINTCHEV
Mr. G. GUELEV
Mr. M. KARASSIMEONOV

Burma:

Mr. J. BARRINGTON
U MAUNG MAUNG GYI

Canada:

Mr. E.L.M. BURNS
Mr. J.E.G. HARDY
Mr. J.F.M. BELL
Mr. R.M. TAIT

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. J. HAJEK
Mr. M. ZEMLA
Mr. J. RIHA

Ethiopia:

ATO HADDIS ALAMAYEHU
ATO M. HAMID
ATO GETACHEW KEBRETH

India:

Mr. A.S. LALL
Mr. A.S. MEHTA
Mr. K. KRISHNA RAO

Italy:

Mr. F. CAVALLETTI
Mr. A. CAGIATI
Mr. C. COSTA REGHINI
Mr. F. LUCIOLI OTTIERI

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (cont'd)

Mexico:

Mr. L. PADILLA NERVO
Mr. E. CALDERON PUIG
Miss E. AGUIRRE
Mr. D. GONZALES GOMEZ

Nigeria:

Mr. M.T. MBU
Mr. L.C.N. OBI

Poland:

Mr. M. LACHS
Mr. S. ROGULSKI
Mr. E. STANIEWSKI
Mr. A. SKOWRONSKI

Romania:

Mr. G. MACOVESCU
Mr. H. FLORESCU
Mr. E. GLASER
Mr. N. ECOBESCU

Sweden:

Mrs. A. MYRDAL
Baron C.H. von PLATEN
Mr. P. KELLIN
Mr. B. FRIEDMAN

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

Mr. V.A. ZORIN
Mr. L.I. MENDELEVITCH
Mr. P.F. SHAKHOV
Mr. V.V. ALDOSHIN

United Arab Republic:

Mr. A. FATTAH HASSAN
Mr. M.H. EL-ZAYYAT
Mr. A.E. ABDEL MAGUID
Mr. M.S. AHMED

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (cont'd)

United Kingdom:

Mr. J.B. GODBER
Sir MICHAEL WRIGHT
Mr. P. SMITHERS
Mr. B.T. PRICE

United States of America:

Mr. A.H. DEAN
Mr. C.C. STELLE
Mr. D.E. MARK
Mr. R.A. MARTIN

Special Representative of the
Secretary-General:

Mr. O. LOUTFI

Deputy to the Special Representative
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. W. EPSTEIN

The CHAIRMAN (Brazil): I declare open the sixty-eighth plenary meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament.

Mr. TARABANOV (Bulgaria) (translation from French): It was with mixed feelings of satisfaction and regret that the delegation of the People's Republic of Bulgaria learned a few days ago that the co-Chairmen had reached a limited agreement on the text of article 4 of the draft treaty on general and complete disarmament, defining the main objectives, the obligations, and the length of the first stage of disarmament (ENDC/55).

Despite the many brackets which enclose the essential provisions of article 4 concerning the main measures of disarmament during the first stage, the compilation of this text enables the Committee to get on with its work of drafting the succeeding articles, prescribing the specific disarmament measures in the first stage. This shows once more that, with good will and the desire to succeed on both sides, the procedure recommended by the co-Chairmen for work on the first stage (ENDC/52) can, after all, give positive results.

By introducing our proposal on article 4 (ENDC/L.17/Rev.1) we were trying, as the co-Chairmen and other representatives have said, to do what we could to establish a compromise between the attitudes underlying the two drafts before us, those of the United States (ENDC/30) and of the Soviet Union (ENDC/2).

We have also tried to embody the constructive suggestions and opinions expressed by other delegations during the discussion.

We notice that the provisions of our proposal borrowed from the United States draft treaty and complying with wishes expressed by other delegations -- on, for example, transition from one stage to the next, and nuclear disarmament measures -- have all been accepted and written into the preliminary draft article 4. These paragraphs certainly have some importance in the search for an agreement. They can help towards success in drafting a treaty on general and complete disarmament.

On the other hand, it is to be noted that the provisions borrowed from the corresponding articles of the Soviet draft have all, or nearly all, been left in brackets. This is the more discouraging since these are precisely the provisions that give a sense of urgency to general and complete disarmament in the first stage and define its scope. They are also the provisions which could satisfy the people's

(Mr. Tarabanov, Bulgaria)

desire to see the threat of nuclear war practically removed in the first stage of the disarmament process. We must conclude that our common efforts to reach a compromise have not produced the results we hoped for, and have not succeeded in keeping the main provisions out of brackets. This compels me to make a few remarks.

First, while the Soviet Union has agreed that the time limit for completing the first stage be fixed at twenty-four months instead of the perfectly adequate fifteen months proposed in its initial draft, the United States remains inflexibly in its original position and insists on the three-year limit it proposed at the outset. It is regrettable that, after the concessions made by the Soviet Union on the length of the first stage, the United States has not seen its way to meet the Soviet Union in this gesture of good will.

Secondly, it is difficult to understand why paragraph 2, embodying the Indian delegation's suggestion about the first-stage measures of nuclear disarmament, has had to be embellished by the following addition in single brackets:

"(,including halting the production of fissionable materials for use in nuclear weapons)." (ENDC/55, p.1)

This is a new attempt to represent cessation of the production of fissionable materials for use in nuclear weapons as a disarmament measure. But it is perfectly clear to anyone with the most elementary notion of disarmament and modern weapons that cessation of the production of fissionable materials for military purposes can in no way be considered as a disarmament measure. Everyone knows that vast quantities of fissionable materials have already been stockpiled by the nuclear Powers. Everyone knows, too, that the nuclear weapons already produced are, in the opinion of experts, amply sufficient to destroy our planet several times over.

What, however, is most regrettable is that the proposal simultaneously to eliminate all nuclear weapon vehicles and military bases on foreign territory, and to withdraw all troops from these territories, should once again be obstinately opposed by the United States delegation. For we should stress that this was precisely the paragraph which made possible an agreement on the abolition of nuclear weapon vehicles and therefore on removal of the threat of nuclear war in the first stage of disarmament.

(Mr. Tarabanov, Bulgaria)

In the discussion on point 5(b) of the co-Chairmen's recommendations on the Committee's agenda (ENDC/52, p.2), it was argued that the abolition of nuclear weapons vehicles and the elimination of military bases in foreign territory would affect the balance between the two parties. It was recommended that we should follow the method of an "across-the-board" percentage reduction proposed in the United States draft. The Western delegations explain that the "across-the-board" principle is the only means of maintaining the present military balance. But it is difficult to understand how a measure like the abolition of nuclear weapon vehicles, which concerns both parties equally, could affect the balance of forces; and how the liquidation of military bases in foreign territory and the withdrawal of foreign troops from these territories, which concerns both parties to the same extent and not one of them only could affect the balance of forces.

While dealing with this question I should like to touch briefly on the argument by which the Canadian representative, Mr. Burns, tried on 6 August to show that the abolition of nuclear weapon vehicles and of military bases in foreign territory would tilt the balance at the end of the first stage in favour of the socialist countries (ENDC/PV.66, pp. 17 et seq.) To give us a figure to serve his purpose -- rejection of the Soviet proposals for the abolition of nuclear weapon vehicles and of bases in foreign territory -- the Canadian representative sought to prove that the Turkish and Greek forces, which according to a British military review amount to 680,000 men, would be of no use whatever as they could not be transported to the scene of the decisive battle. Mr. Burns said, in fact:

"He (Mr. Zorin) objected to my excluding Turkey and Greece from the total of the NATO forces which could exercise any effect on that front. But Mr. Zorin's military advisers know perfectly well that Greek and Turkish troops would have to be first moved by sea, and then make a long road or rail journey: and long before they had even got part of the way the decisive battle would have been fought and over.

"Mr. Zorin also made the point that some forces of the Warsaw Pact Powers would have to face those of Greece and Turkey on the Macedonian front, and some to face Turkish troops in the Caucasus. That is doubtless so, but even if we allow that 200,000

(Mr. Tarabanov, Bulgaria)

Soviet troops would have to be stationed on those fronts, and others, and that some of the Bulgarian and Romanian forces would also have to face Turkish and Greek troops, yet my basic argument is untouched." (ENDC/PV.66, p.17)

I make this short digression because, as everyone can see, this aspect of the problem of balance directly concerns Bulgaria.

Are we to understand from the Canadian representative's statement that NATO does not intend to take into account the front formed, or to be formed, by the frontiers of Turkey and Greece, or to fight on the main front? Have the NATO allies of Turkey and Greece no intention of bothering about the Macedonian front, as Mr. Burns states, nor the Thracian front, which is a continuation of the Macedonian front constituted by the Bulgar-Turkish frontier? Do they not intend to bother about the Caucasian front which would be constituted on the Turkish-Soviet frontier? If those are their intentions, it would be very interesting if they said so now. Then the Warsaw Pact countries could for their part take no account of the troops opposed to the Turkish and Greek troops. Moreover, if the Western countries do not intend to use their allies' troops, if these troops are unimportant and useless, would it not be better to spare the military budgets of those countries the unnecessary overload? That would tend immediately to improve the political atmosphere in the Balkans.

It is well known that for years the People's Republics of Bulgaria and Romania have been suggesting to the Governments of Turkey and Greece an agreement on a series of measures to transform the Balkans into a denuclearized zone, conclude a non-aggression pact, and reduce armed forces more or less to frontier guards. If the Western Powers do not intend to take the Turkish and Greek troops into account, why do they not let their allies, Turkey and Greece, know that this is their firm intention? That might promote peaceful coexistence and mutual understanding in the Balkans; that might make for peace.

But we see facts that prove the exact opposite. Not only do the Western Powers not tell their allies in the Balkans and the Eastern Mediterranean that they do not consider their troops capable of contributing to the "decisive battle", as Mr. Burns puts it, but every day they make more and more intensive preparations to develop the Macedonian and Thracian fronts against Bulgaria, and the Caucasian

(Mr. Tarabanov, Bulgaria)

front against the Soviet Union. Last year they again held great military manoeuvres in close co-operation with Turkish and Greek troops on our southern and south-eastern frontiers. The rearmament of the NATO countries adjacent to Bulgaria with the most modern weapons --- rockets and atomic weapons -- not only continues but is being intensified.

In this connexion I should like to draw attention to an interview which the United States General Lindsley gave to Mr. Ilias Dimitrakopoulos, political editor of the Greek newspaper Athens Daily Post, on 12 February 1960^{1/}:

"Question: Do you consider that the establishment of intermediate-range ballistic-missile bases on Greek territory will strengthen the country's defensive capacity, or do you consider that their establishment in Turkey and Italy does away with the need to establish them on Greek territory?"

"Answer: We consider the South European zone of NATO a single entity, and we are obtaining the armaments necessary to carry out our tasks in the region as a whole, so as to be able to meet any threat and maintain our deterrent strength. Of course, the more intermediate-range ballistic-missile bases NATO has in the South European zone, the greater will be our deterrent strength."

That is the present situation and the present plan for the Turkish and Greek armies, which according to Mr. Burns do not count in the East-West balance of force in Europe.

As the People's Republic of Bulgaria adjoins a region where the Western Powers are making great efforts to organize a striking force against the socialist countries and directly against ourselves, we are particularly interested in this question. If, however, the Western Powers do not intend to use the forces which they are preparing in this region, it would be a very good thing if they said so more clearly and consistently than they have done so far. It might perhaps help to change the lines along which relations between the Balkan countries are developing, and open new opportunities for their development.

^{1/} Translated from French.

(Mr. Tarabanov, Bulgaria)

In conclusion I should like to express the hope that the Western delegations will try again to reconsider their position on the essential disarmament measures which should be in the first stage of any programme of general and complete disarmament worthy of the name. By agreeing on the essential disarmament measures to be included in the first stage, such as the abolition of nuclear weapon vehicles and the liquidation of military bases in foreign territory, we shall allay the fears of the peoples and assure them that the threat of a nuclear war is practically removed.

Mr. DEAN (United States of America): First let me say very briefly that at the meeting of the Sub-Committee on a Treaty for the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests which was held yesterday afternoon it was agreed, subject to the approval of the Conference, to recommend a plenary meeting on that subject on Tuesday next, 14 August.

This morning I should like to discuss in this Committee the question of verification in connexion with requirements for verifying fulfilment of stage I obligations regarding armaments which include, of course, military vehicles capable of delivering both nuclear and conventional weapons. As the Conference is well aware, the United States disarmament plan provides in stage I for the reduction of approximately one-third of such armaments. In addition to that reduction of 30 per cent the production of major armaments would be halted except for replacements. There would be no increase in such armaments above the levels prescribed for stage I.

The question we should like to discuss at this time is: how can each party be given the necessary assurance that the agreed upon reductions are in fact taking place in accordance with an agreed schedule, that production is in fact being limited as agreed, and that agreed remaining levels are not exceeded? This question is germane to the disarmament plan of the Soviet Union as well as to the disarmament plan of the United States. In the first stage of both plans major armaments are being reduced from one level to a lower level; the problem of assuring that armaments are not hidden is a crucial one in either plan, although it is posed even more rapidly and more acutely by the Soviet proposal of certain

(Mr. Dean, United States)

100 per cent cuts in the first stage of disarmament. In both plans production of major armaments is curtailed, and in both therefore there remains the key question of assuring that clandestine production is not going on.

Verification of the reduction of major armaments involves three types of measures. One is verification that the arms to be reduced are, in fact, destroyed or converted to peaceful purposes. The second is verification to ensure that the production of new types of armaments has, in fact, been halted and that strict limitations on the amount of production for replacement have not been exceeded. The third is verification to assure that remaining quantities of armaments do not exceed agreed levels; to do this it must be assured that undeclared weapons are not hidden or that undeclared production facilities do not, in fact, exist.

My purpose in speaking today is to give some elaboration of each of these three types of verification measures and then to comment on some aspects of verification in general. The first aspect of verification for major armaments involves a check to see that weapons being reduced are actually destroyed or, if not destroyed, are -- in fact and in truth -- converted to peaceful purposes. Both the plans of the United States and the Soviet Union now before the Conference provide for that type of verification.

Under the United States plan, during the first year 10 per cent of armaments to be reduced would be brought to agreed depots for destruction or for conversion to peaceful uses. We must decide where those agreed depots should be located in each of our respective countries, and what types of armaments are to be deposited at each depot. These questions of detail need not be decided at this moment, but they must in time be worked out. In the United States plan a reduction of 10 per cent of the armaments in 12 months will involve many thousands of individual pieces of armaments, and the actual dismantling of those many thousand or pieces -- which must take place each week and each month -- is a process that can proceed smoothly and efficiently only if an agreed upon schedule is worked out prior to the entry into force of the treaty.

One question, for example, is: must the armament to be reduced be in usable form before it is placed in the depot? That is, must a plane be actually flyable, or a tank workable, or a submarine able to operate efficiently submerged; that is, are we going to count a submarine as a submarine if most of its effective parts

(Mr. Dean, United States)

have been removed before it is turned over to the depot? If we did not require that armaments be usable it is possible that a country might dismantle only its most run-down equipment -- that is, its most out-of-date or its most inefficient equipment and, perhaps, even some with parts missing. It might "cannibalize" a piece of equipment, retain all the parts and turn over only the shell. If that were permitted, to what extent would it be a violation of the agreement? Some of these problems are dealt with in the two papers submitted by the representative of the United Kingdom (ENDC/53 and ENDC/54). Although these are most important questions they are, in fact, easier to solve than the other two types of verification measures I mentioned earlier. Also, the methods for solution suggested by the United States and the Soviet Union do not seem -- on the surface, at least, for this type of measure -- to be too far apart.

The second aspect of verification for major armaments concerns production. Both the Soviet Union and United States plans provide for a limitation on the production of major armaments. In the Soviet plan, production of vehicles capable of delivering nuclear weapons is supposed to be halted. As has been mentioned, there is a most considerable amount of ambiguity in the Soviet draft in that it also provides for the production of rockets for the peaceful exploration of space. Whether something is for the peaceful exploration of space or for warlike purposes may only be subjective in the mind of the particular nation. We do not know to what extent production of conventional armaments would be stopped under the Soviet plan. We are waiting for some Soviet comments on these as well as other points in the Soviet plan which are to us quite unclear. When it is said that something will not be destroyed because it is for the peaceful exploration of space, I submit that that is merely a subjective explanation.

Under the United States plan all facilities involved in the production of major armaments would be declared in toto. We would submit a list of all the plants in the United States that have been producing major armaments. That list would be accompanied by certain specific kinds of information which we, the parties, would deem necessary to present to the international disarmament organization. For example, we might want to specify the types of armaments or parts thereof being produced or assembled at each facility, and certain other economic records might also be supplied to the international disarmament organization.

(Mr. Dean, United States)

To verify that production was in fact being limited according to the agreement, the United States plan does not require the stationing of inspectors at all production plants, but only at those that are relevant. The United States plan makes a distinction between all military production facilities and relevant military production facilities. In other words, under the United States plan the declaration would include a listing describing the nature and location of all facilities involved in the production of major armaments. However, inspectors would not necessarily have access to all major production facilities that would be declared. Our plan only calls for inspectors to have access to relevant facilities wherever they are located in the territories of parties to the treaty.

What do we mean by "relevant facilities"? The United States delegation does not think it is necessary at this time to give a detailed definition of what it means by this term "relevant facilities"; but some mention can be made of what we do and of what we do not mean by that term in order that representatives may think about it. We should not want inspectors to have access to every facility producing only small parts of a given nuclear delivery vehicle or other armament. We do not think that that would be either efficient or necessary, but we should want inspectors to have access to all the major assembly plants for armaments and to all plants producing key parts for each armament. For example, they ought to have access to plants producing missile engines, air frames, and tank bodies. Perhaps even fuel production facilities might also be included. I mention these by way of examples.

The third aspect of verification for major armaments is that if each party is reducing its armaments by a certain percentage of its total amount, then there must be some means to assure that the declaration of the total is an accurate and not a fictitious figure. There must also be verification that clandestine production is not going on, either in that country or by contract in other countries.

The hiding of weapons or the concealment of production must be prevented. Let us look for a moment at what might happen if a State did attempt to hide certain weapons. Let us just assume that a State has, for example, 500 inter-continental ballistic missiles of which, under the United States plan, 30 per cent would be reduced in stage I — that is, 150 missiles. But if — instead

(Mr. Dean, United States)

of the true number, 500 missiles — that State declared only 300 missiles that would mean that 90 and not the correct number of 150 would need to be reduced.

During the very early part of the disarmament process a discrepancy of 60 missiles in the number that should have been destroyed compared to the large number retained might or might not affect a State's security to a crucial extent. But only the other day the Soviet Union tested a weapon of some 40 megatons and it is supposed to have tested another of 58 megatons, or perhaps even more. And as these weapons go up to perhaps 100 megatons, the concealment of half a dozen weapons of that size would be very significant. As the process goes on, as the countries reduce their armaments, naturally the importance of the concealed number does become really crucial. It becomes far more important as we proceed from stage to stage.

By stage III, this assumed State concealing inter-continental ballistic missiles would have 200 left while the State not concealing missiles would have none. The implications of this situation need not be laboured. Under the Soviet plan the importance of accurately verifying the total amount becomes even more crucial in stage I because every military missile, every aircraft, every ship, every tank, every piece of artillery, every rocket and every spacecraft capable of delivering a nuclear weapon, without any exception, would have to be destroyed or converted to peaceful uses over a period of two years.

In the past the United States had a position on verification which involved verification before actual disarmament took place. Previously the United States had proposed verification of initial levels and either verification of reductions or verification of remaining levels. Excluding the question of production, if initial levels and actual reductions could be verified, it would not be as necessary to verify remaining levels as it would be if the declaration was not subject to verification at the very beginning of the disarmament process. This would be the most accurate, the most efficient and the most consistent with modern accounting methods. But in view of the attitude that has been expressed by the Soviet Union with respect to any verification of initial levels before the actual process of reduction has begun — since the Soviet delegation refuses to go along with that theory — the United States and other Powers have suggested the possibility of another approach to verification, in order to make progress.

(Mr. Dean, United States)

It is fundamental that we understand the real significance of the verification of agreed remaining levels has necessarily been increased by a willingness of the United States and other Powers to forgo verification of initial levels before any reductions take place. That is the way accountants would normally do it, but the Soviet Union has objected to that proposal.

With respect to this third aspect of the verification question, the United States has suggested the possibility of a plan for verification by selecting only a certain portion of the territory of a country to be inspected at a time. We have termed this verification by zones. Thus, the amount of inspection on any country's territory would be related to the amount of disarmament undertaken and to the degree of risk involved.

In the United States plan as now presented some disarmament actually takes place before any verification. In other words, armaments would be taken from their arsenals and placed in agreed depots under the supervision of the international disarmament organization. This is a part of the reduction process and would take place before any actual verification had occurred.

So what is important is to ensure that the armaments placed in a depot for destruction or conversion to peaceful purposes accurately represent the actual types and the actual number of armaments that each nation has agreed to reduce within a determined schedule. If one does not start off accurately every other reduction is of course coloured accordingly. If there were no opportunities to verify the accuracy of the remaining levels each State party to the treaty would have no assurance whatsoever that a given percentage of a nation's armaments was in fact and in truth being destroyed.

The United States has suggested, purely for illustrative purposes, that before armaments placed in the international disarmament organization's supervised depots are destroyed each party to the treaty would divide its territory into an agreed number of zones. Let me say something about this term "agreed number of appropriate zones". Let me make it clear that the United States has no fixed idea about how many zones there should be for any particular country or what is the best or most efficient size for a zone in any particular country. We have been hoping that the Soviet Union would give us some ideas on how it would like to see verification carried

(Mr. Dean, United States)

out; but, since the Soviet Union has not responded at all and has so far failed to give any details whatsoever on this question of verification, let me describe some of the possible methods for determining zones. We want to put them before our colleagues clearly for their consideration.

One possibility is to divide a country into a small number of zones of approximately equal size. For example, without prejudice, and using very simple arithmetic in order to make the presentation of the problem as simple as possible, let us take nine zones. In that case it would be likely that only one zone would be chosen for inspection at any one time. That would mean that over a staged disarmament process consisting of three steps within each stage one zone would be inspected for each step of each stage. Once a zone had been inspected it would remain open for further inspection. By the end of stage III all zones would have been inspected.

A system involving a small number of large zones might work somewhat as follows, and I give this also just by way of example and without prejudice. In this example, before the beginning of the inspection process parties to the treaty would divide their territory into an agreed number of large zones and would declare by zones to the international disarmament organization the total number of forces and the total number of armaments of the types to be limited. At the very beginning of the disarmament process one side would choose a zone in each country of the other side. As soon as the zone was selected the host country would declare for the selected zone the detailed location of the forces and agreed armaments in that zone. Once a zone had been selected for inspection no forces or agreed armaments could be shifted to or from that zone until inspection was under way; after that, shifts to or from that zone would be permitted, provided that sufficient notice had been given to the inspecting authorities and that the declared inventories were adjusted accordingly.

In order to deter or discover any attempts to remove forces or limited armaments from the zone in question each side would be allowed to station inspectors at major airports and at major railway and highway centres situated on railways and highways crossing the boundaries of the zones or located near zonal boundaries to the extent deemed necessary by the inspecting authorities. When a zone had been selected the inspectors stationed in it would be free to start immediately to employ such

(Mr. Dean, United States)

verification measures as they might deem necessary, including mobile inspection teams and aerial photography. The inspectors situated at rail and highway centres near the boundaries of the selected zone would be entitled to check to ensure that no forces or agreed armaments were removed from the selected zone after the moment of selection. The inspection of the first zone would take place during the first step of the first stage. Two more zones would be inspected during the second and third steps of stage I. Similar procedures would be followed in the second stage, if there should be only nine zones — which, as I said, is the example I took for illustrative purposes only.

Another possibility might be to have a large number of small zones. Each country could be divided into an agreed number of zones. For example, the United States might be divided into some 200 to 400 zones. In that case several zones, the number of which would be agreed upon, would be chosen for inspection at a time. The host country would provide the international disarmament organization with the total number of forces and agreed armaments in each zone. The host country might appoint a senior military representative in each zone who would keep more detailed records of the disposition of agreed armaments and forces in his zone. Inspection teams of the international disarmament organization would be permitted to travel by prescribed routes at times of their own choosing to the cities in which the senior zonal military representatives were located. The inspection would involve the physical count — using some sampling, such as counting one unit out of five, or any other agreed system — of forces and agreed armaments.

Under this example, in order to relate the amount of inspection to the actual amount of disarmament and to the degree of risk, the number of zonal inspections made during the first step of stage I might be relatively small. The number of zonal inspections could be increased in the second step, and so on, as experience warranted, so that the number of zonal inspections in any step would be generally related to the actual amount of disarmament and to the risks incurred.

It is important to stress that only when a zone or zones were selected for inspection would the specific geographical location of any armaments be declared. Prior to that the declaration would cover only totals of troops and armaments in a zone without indicating their actual location or deployment. If the area of each zone were fairly large — as would surely be the case in both the United States and

(Mr. Dean, United States)

the Soviet Union — then the initial general declaration on the military establishment in the zone would not give a hostile Power any militarily useful target information, as the Soviet Union has incorrectly claimed. After the location of armaments had been given the international disarmament organization would check the zone or zones to ensure that the declaration of armaments within that zone given earlier, but without location at that time, was accurate.

What would the disarmament inspectors look for in a zone? They would not go to relevant production facilities because other inspectors would already have been stationed at such facilities. They would verify the levels of forces and armaments declared for that zone as well as check for undeclared production facilities.

I should like to point out also that prior to the declarations each State would be free to distribute its armaments and military forces throughout the zones as it wished. Each State would be free also to draw the armed forces and armaments to be reduced from whatever zone it wished, although of course if part of the forces and arms to be reduced were drawn from a zone selected for inspection the State would necessarily have to inform the international disarmament organization so that its declaration for that zone could be appropriately modified.

These possible verification arrangements, examples of which I have been describing — and I wish to emphasize that they are only examples — are aimed at starting the disarmament process with a limited amount of inspection. The degree of verification would necessarily have to be increased as the number of armaments destroyed grew larger and the consequences to a nation's security became more serious in the event of one nation hiding arms in violation of the agreement. In the early steps of disarmament the access to the territory of a nation would be small compared to the amount of access at later stages, when accuracy would become much more important. That concept is intended to meet the concerns of those States, such as the Soviet Union, which feel that they must conceal as much information as possible. The problem of concealing may be somewhat more complicated in countries where people may move around freely without permission from the authorities, or where there is a free Press.

Let me conclude my remarks by stressing once again the purpose of verification in a disarmament agreement. The purpose of verification is the same regardless of whether the disarmament measure is a treaty banning nuclear weapon tests

(Mr. Dean, United States).

or a reduction of major armaments and the halting of production of such armaments. Each party to disarmament wants to know that the other parties are in fact and in truth adhering to the spirit and letter of the agreement, for a country violating the agreement might achieve a distinct military advantage, with all the political consequences that can flow from such an advantage. Such a country might be tempted to use that military advantage for political aggrandizement, which might take the form of aggression. The key reason for verification measures is to prevent any country achieving a secret and crucial military advantage as a result of a disarmament agreement. The military advantage gained would not even have to be decisive; it would only need to be enough to persuade one party that its advantage was sufficient to warrant running the risks of an adventure which might include war.

There is still another reason why efficient verification is most important. If one party to an agreement thinks another party is hiding arms, or secretly producing weapons, or secretly testing weapons, but cannot check on the other party's territory to ascertain the facts, then tension and discord will mount. Past experiences have shown that not knowing the true situation with regard to what is going on in another country can increase international tensions and can result in irresponsible action. It is like the patient who thinks he has a dreadful and incurable disease but cannot get to a doctor for a diagnosis. His ignorance concerning his trouble may turn to fear; he thinks the worst may be happening, and his fear may lead him to commit irrational acts. Like the proper diagnosis, verification is needed so that doubt can be dispelled and so that no one need harbour fears which may have no basis in fact but which may nevertheless poison the international atmosphere. Great reassurance comes from knowing the true situation, whether it be in diagnosing an illness, in ascertaining that one country is not secretly arming against another or in determining that a country is not testing nuclear weapons in violation of an agreement.

For its part the United States is prepared to accept some limited or calculated risks in a disarmament programme, for the continuation of the arms race itself involves risk for all of us. But the risks relating to verification must not be so large or so uncertain that they either threaten the basic security of States or poison the international atmosphere to such an extent that the various stages of disarmament cannot go on.

(Mr. Dean, United States)

With these criteria in mind the United States has searched for ways in which the concerns relating to verification that have been expressed by the Soviet Union in the past might be met. A result of that search has been the suggestion that we study together whether the concept of zonal inspection might open avenues to verification arrangements acceptable to all and yet affording a reasonable degree of assurance that obligations undertaken were in fact being fulfilled. We do not claim that we know all the answers in connexion with the problem of verification; far from it. But we do urge the Soviet Government to consider these suggestions seriously, to study them and to reply to them. For our part, we are prepared to consider all Soviet suggestions and to discuss specific questions or concerns regarding those suggestions, or any that other Governments represented here may have. Indeed, if the Soviet delegation or any other delegation has alternative proposals, by all means let us hear them; let us have them on the table so that we can study them. We are not putting these zonal proposals before the Committee with any idea at all that they are necessarily the complete answer to the problem, but we do put them forward as concrete suggestions in order that we may make progress.

If there are defects in them let us hear about them. If members of the Committee want to ask questions about them we are quite prepared to answer any and all questions with respect to them. We have no axe to grind with respect to these suggestions. Nor do we think that they are necessarily perfect — in fact we know that they are not perfect — and if any delegation has any suggestions to make or any ways of improving them, we will be most delighted to listen to the suggestions and answer the questions, either here in public meetings or in private. But if we are to make progress on disarmament, as I am sure we all want to, a dialogue is necessary. There is no point in continuing endlessly a discussion with oneself, which we have been doing so far, I am sorry to say, on the zonal suggestion. My delegation hopes that the dialogue and the serious questioning, serious examination and serious work on these problems of verification will start now and will move progressively forward.

Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian):
The Soviet delegation intended this morning to sum up to some extent the discussion of paragraph 5 (b) of our agreed programme of work for the study of the questions

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

of stage I, and it is my intention to do so later on; but the statement which the United States representative has just made interested me. I shall therefore take the liberty of devoting the first part of my statement to the views which were expressed in a businesslike manner by the United States representative and which, I repeat, are of definite practical interest.

The United States representative today spoke at some length to explain how the United States visualizes the methods of verification of the arms to be reduced or destroyed and also, apparently, of the reduction of armed forces. He pointed out at the beginning that there are three questions which arise in this connexion; first, verification that the arms to be reduced are, in fact, destroyed and also apparently, verification of the quota of troops to be disbanded. The second is verification of production, that is of the reduction or cessation of production, and he referred in particular to the production of new types of armaments; and the third is verification to assure that remaining quantities of armaments not exceed agreed levels and in order to be assured that undeclared weapons are not hidden. Moreover, he explained that this last type of verification related not only to the level of existing armaments but also to the level of production, so I understood him to say.

He spoke in detail on each of these questions. on each element of verification. I am bound to say that quite a lot of what he told us this morning is not contrary to our position. It accords with many of our views and proposals concerning control on quite a number of points. Take, for instance, verification of the arms to be destroyed and eliminated or reduced. What did Mr. Dean say? He said that we should declare in advance the agreed depots and start bringing the weapons to these depots, and then the inspectors must carefully verify that the weapons being deposited were usable weapons and not, so to speak, discarded ones; that aircraft brought to the depot were actually flyable, submarines coming to the appropriate base were able to operate efficiently submerged and so on; in other words, that the armaments sent to the depot for destruction were efficient weapons and that there would be assurance that what was being destroyed were really efficient weapons and not discarded ones. After all, that is not contrary to our general positions. On the whole it agrees with our positions on questions of that sort. Further, Mr. Dean said that we would have to declare what the various types of armaments earmarked for destruction were

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

composed of and what the production situation was, or, to be more precise, where the relevant production plants were situated and what they were producing, so that it would be possible to verify how far the declaration that they had ceased the prohibited production was true. In other words, the inspectors would visit the plant and see whether or not it really had ceased this production as had been declared. That is what Mr. Dean said regarding the second type of verification in respect of cessation of production of armaments and in particular, of new types of armaments.

Moreover, he argued in some detail, trying to convince some one or other, that it was necessary to take a very careful look to see that there was no production of new types of armaments and that, if it had been agreed that a certain type of armament was to be completely destroyed, the production of any new types had ceased. Here again there is no contradiction with our position.

Although Mr. Dean, for some reason, spoke about the ambiguity of our proposals, I simply failed to understand in what their ambiguity consists. He mentioned that in our proposals it is not clearly stated whether certain types of production are to be converted or whether certain types of armaments are to be destroyed or not. I do not know how carefully Mr. Dean has read our proposals, but if one takes, say, the articles of stage I of our draft treaty, chapter I, it will be seen that in articles 5, 6, 7 and 8, in all the articles dealing with specific types of armaments which are nuclear weapon vehicles, everything in this regard is stated quite clearly and unambiguously. Paragraph 2 of article 5 reads:

"2. The production of all kinds of rockets and pilotless aircraft, and of the materials and instruments for their equipment, launching and guidance ... shall be completely discontinued. All enterprises, or workshops thereof, engaged in their production shall be dismantled; machine tools and equipment specially and exclusively designed for the production of such items shall be destroyed; the premises of such enterprises, as well as general purpose machine tools and equipment shall be converted to peaceful uses. All proving grounds for tests of such rockets and pilotless aircraft shall be demolished."

(ENDC/2, pp.5 and 6)

What is there in this that is not clear? Where is the ambiguity? In my opinion, there is no ambiguity. If Mr. Dean thinks that there is some ambiguity with regard

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

to types of rockets which can be used for peaceful purposes, here again everything is stated just as precisely in paragraph 4 of our article 5 which reads:

"4. For the peaceful exploration of space the production and testing of appropriate rockets shall be allowed, provided that the plants producing such rockets, as well as the rockets themselves, will be subject to supervision by the inspectors of the International Disarmament Organization." (ibid.)

Where is the ambiguity? In my opinion, it is all perfectly clear. In other words, we agree to allow inspectors into the plants which would be left for the production of rockets for peaceful purposes in order to ensure that nothing unconnected with the peaceful exploration of space happened to be introduced during the production of these rockets for peaceful purposes. We speak of this quite frankly and do not object to it. But when the rockets are brought to the appropriate launching site, we propose that there should be present a group of inspectors who would observe a rocket being assembled and what is being put into it, whether there is being put into it a nuclear bomb or a cockpit for the next astronaut who is to fly into space. Where is the ambiguity? What is there that is not clear? I don't quite understand, Mr. Dean.

Furthermore, article 6, paragraph 2, reads as follows:

"2. The production of all military aircraft referred to in Paragraph 1 of this article shall be completely discontinued. Enterprises, or workshops thereof, designed for the production of such military aircraft shall be either dismantled or converted to the production of civil aircraft or other peaceful items." (ibid.)

And paragraph 3 reads:

"3. Inspectors of the International Disarmament Organization shall verify the implementation of the measures referred to above in paragraphs 1 and 2." (ibid.)

Therefore it is clear that if you wish to discontinue the production of all military aircraft and if enterprises and workshops designed for this production are to be dismantled or converted to the production of civil aircraft and other peaceful items, this must of course be controlled and verified. That is what we say in paragraph 3. You will send inspectors to these enterprises and they will verify whether the machine tools required for the production of certain types of equipment

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

for military aircraft are really dismantled or whether something has been concealed. That is quite a simple matter to verify in a factory; a factory is a limited area. Therefore you can easily verify whether dismantling has really taken place or not.

In Article 7, Paragraph 2, we read the following:

"2. The building of warships and submarines referred to in Paragraph 1 of this Article shall be completely discontinued..." (ibid., p.7)

And paragraph 1 states that:

"1. All surface warships, capable of being used as vehicles for nuclear weapons, and submarines of any class or type shall be eliminated from the armed forces and destroyed..." (ibid., p.6)

Paragraph 2 states further:

"... Shipyards and plants wholly or in part designed for the building of such warships and submarines shall be dismantled or converted to peaceful production." (ibid., p.7)

Paragraph 3 of the same article states once again:

"3. Inspectors of the International Disarmament Organization shall verify the implementation of the measures referred to above in Paragraph 1 and 2." (ibid.)

In other words, inspectors will also be sent to shipyards and plants designed for the building of such ships and submarines in order to verify whether production has actually been discontinued. What is there not clear in that? Where is the ambiguity? Where is there anything different from what you have been saying? It even corresponds on the whole with what you too have been saying. By the way, since Mr. Cavalletti was so interested in artillery, I shall also read what we say about artillery. Paragraph 2 of article 8 reads:

"2. The production of the artillery systems referred to above in Paragraph 1 of this Article shall be completely discontinued..." (ibid.)

I shall not repeat Paragraph 1 which deals with artillery systems, capable of serving as means of delivery for nuclear weapons. Paragraph 2 continues:

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

"To this end all plants, or workshops thereof, engaged in the production of such systems shall be closed or dismantled. All specialized equipment and machine tools at these plants and workshops shall be destroyed, the remainder being converted to peaceful uses. The production of non-nuclear munitions for the artillery systems shall be discontinued. Plants and workshops engaged in the production of such munitions shall be completely dismantled, and their specialized equipment destroyed." (ibid.)

Paragraph 3 of article 8 states once again:

"3. Inspectors of the International Disarmament Organization shall verify the implementation of the measures referred to above in Paragraphs 1 and 2." (ibid.)

In other words, inspectors will go to these plants and verify again whether everything laid down in paragraph 2 has been carried out.

I do not understand why any doubts or questions should arise. I consider that what Mr. Dean has said today is not at variance with the provisions in this part of the draft, and our position, I would say, is not at variance with the position which Mr. Dean has expounded on these matters.

Therefore, in regard to two types of verification, I think that the main provisions coincide.

Now for the third type of verification concerning the remaining armaments, that is, verification for the purpose of ensuring that they do not exceed the agreed level and that they are not being concealed. I must say, in the first place, that in regard to this third type of verification concerning the remaining armaments, under our programme for stage I in respect of nuclear weapons delivery vehicles this question either does not arise at all or is reduced to an absolute minimum. Why? Because we propose to eliminate completely all types of weapons which could be used as delivery vehicles. They are to be eliminated 100 per cent. Then what remaining weapons would there be? 100 per cent are to be eliminated. Therefore you can go to the depots and see for yourselves whether all have been eliminated and also visit the various plants and see whether all production of these types of weapons has been stopped. We agree to this. Certainly you can verify. Therefore this question does not arise at all. And when Mr. Dean said that if, let us assume, the production of rockets had not been discontinued or, say, two hundred rockets were being concealed, would not that be very terrible? Of course, it would be very terrible.

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

But under your plan it would be much easier to conceal two hundred rockets than under our plan, because under your plan you would destroy only 30 per cent of the rockets. Isn't that so? Therefore 70 per cent would remain, but among the remaining 70 per cent of rockets it would be much easier to conceal two hundred excess rockets than when, as we say, they must be eliminated 100 per cent. In other words, with 100 per cent elimination, if you merely see in any place that there are rockets, or you receive information that there are rockets, that would mean that the treaty is being violated. Am I not right? With our 100 per cent elimination, even if a single rocket turned up that was undestroyed, that would imply a violation of the treaty.

If, under your plan, any of us discovered that in the United States there were some excess rockets, well, you would say to us: "I beg your pardon, we are entitled to retain 70 per cent. Why do you consider that these are excess rockets? Let us count our rockets again. We have such and such a number of rockets and those which you consider to be in excess are part of the permitted 70 per cent." We will then say to you: "No, we don't believe you." And you will say in reply: "But why don't you believe us? We have told you that we have so many rockets. You say that we have put away a certain number of our rockets in such and such a place. Yes, they have been put away, we have them, but they are of a number that forms part of the permitted 70 per cent."

It is quite obvious that in such a situation it would be much more difficult to carry out verification and to obtain evidence that the other side is hiding something. Under our plan the situation is quite different. We say that 100 per cent of the rockets will be eliminated and we will present this 100 per cent for elimination. But imagine for a moment that you have received information that at a certain place there is still another rocket, and if you verify this information and find that rocket in that place, you will catch the violator red-handed, as the expression goes, because to find even a single rocket is to prove violation. Is that true or is it not?

Or let us take the case of submarines. We have told you that we have 100 submarines which we have presented for destruction. But afterwards you suddenly discover yet another submarine, and you find that it is a Soviet submarine. That

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

would be an unquestionable case of violation and it would immediately be obvious that it is a violation, because 100 per cent should have been eliminated and yet another one turned up. We would be quite unable to justify ourselves, because under the treaty we should not have a single remaining submarine, as submarines must be eliminated 100 per cent.

Under your system of percentage reduction not one but hundreds of submarines may turn up and you will tell us that they form part of the permitted 70 per cent that remained. How can we verify this? What can we do? How can we verify the actual numbers?

I am putting these questions because I simply wish to approach the substance of the matter in a businesslike manner, and I think that what I am saying now is deserving of attention because under the system of 100 per cent elimination it is easier to detect any clandestine violation. That is unquestionable, because with 100 per cent reduction any detection would immediately show whether you had violated the treaty or not. With 70 per cent of the armaments remaining it would be almost impossible to prove this, because we should then have to inspect the entire country from one end to the other and, it seems, to act as General Burns has told us, that is literally scour the whole country if we wished to prove that any remainder was not part of the permitted 70 per cent but in excess of it. Just try and prove it. To do that one would have to count every type of armament. But is that possible in practice?

I am raising this question in order to make it clear to you that there is no question of any lack of good will on our part nor of our prestige because, they say, we have put forward a proposal for a 100 per cent reduction and we do not want to accept anything else. No, we say that our approach is reasonable, first, from the point of view of the substance of the matter, because 100 per cent destruction of the means of delivery is a certain guarantee that there will be no nuclear attack right in the first stage of disarmament. This is reasonable from the point of view of the substance of the matter. And, secondly, it is reasonable from the point of view of control, because it is easier to control any remaining quantity when there is 100 per cent elimination than when there is 70 per cent reduction. That is perfectly clear. I do not think that you will be able to put forward any arguments against that. If you have any arguments I am prepared to listen to them.

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

Thus, with our approach to the question which provides for 100 per cent elimination of the means of delivery, the remaining armaments are either completely removed or reduced to the absolute minimum.

Further, you dealt with the three methods of verification which you are now proposing. You told us today that in the past the United States had advocated all-round verification of the levels of armaments and armed forces existing before the beginning of disarmament. Now you have stated that the United States has given up such verification.

I am very glad to hear this statement, although Mr. Burns at the last meeting said that he in fact still advocated verification of the levels before disarmament. There seems to be some lack of co-ordination between you. That is your affair, a family one, as the saying goes, but what Mr. Burns actually told us yesterday as well as at a previous meeting, and for which I criticized him, was that there must be verification before disarmament begins. Therefore there is some lack of co-ordination between you. But I think that in this matter the United States will succeed in convincing Canada. I hope so.

Let us suppose that you have really given up verification of levels before disarmament. What do you then propose? You want to verify the remaining armaments and armed forces by means of zonal inspection. You described in detail how this would be done and you said that armaments would be sent to depots before any verification, so that the actual types of armaments to be reduced would be there; further, before being placed in the depots, all armaments would be appropriately divided and classified and you went on to say that the whole country would be divided, for example, into nine zones.

Further, you said that before inspection begins the governments would inform the international disarmament organization of the total number of troops and armaments in the selected zone, without indicating their actual location or deployment. You postpone to a later period the supplying of information on location or deployment. Then you and we select a zone for verification. After that inspectors will be stationed in that zone. They will exercise control essentially over all types of armaments to be reduced or destroyed. But I don't seem to have heard you say "everything to be reduced or destroyed." You simply said that inspectors would be stationed at all relevant points, at airports, at the depots, at the concentration

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

points of troops subject to disbandment, at launching pads, at production plants and so on. You also said that inspectors would be stationed along the boundaries of the selected zone; moreover, there would be mobile inspection teams and control would be established at the boundaries of the zone to ensure that no forces or agreed armaments had been removed from the selected zone to another.

Further, you said that in on-site verification at the depots and so on one could use a sampling count, so to speak, and you said by way of example, so far as I remember, that it would be possible to verify by some sampling five types of armaments to see whether they conformed to the declared standard or not. I realize that that is a reasonable approach; it can be done in that way in order not to have to verify absolutely everything, all the thousands of rifles of the same type; but one could select at random a hundred different rifles at the depot in question and see whether they were really fit for use and so forth and so forth.

Further, you said that you would pass gradually from one zone to another, depending on the course of further disarmament, so that by the end of disarmament the entire country would have been inspected. That is what I understood you to say.

Now let us take a look at all this from the point of view of its feasibility and from the point of view of the actual achievement of the purposes which you assign to zonal inspection. I should like to ask you a question: assuming 100 per cent elimination of any type of armament or means of delivery, will this zonal type of inspection ensure that the entire 100 per cent will be eliminated? I do not think it will. The zonal method of inspection, as you have described it, cannot give us the assurance that 100 per cent of a particular type of armament will be eliminated. I think this is perfectly clear, because if you take zones forming 30 per cent of the entire territory of a country, or 10 per cent in the first year, it is obvious that you will not verify 90 per cent or 70 per cent at least. What can you verify? You can only verify what is in a given place, in a given zone, what has been presented for destruction. Is this not so?

Consequently the danger you refer to --- the danger of 200 rockets being retained somewhere -- will increase immensely. You do not verify at all the remaining 90 or 70 per cent, do you? True, you may say: "But anyway we select the zone ourselves and therefore we may by chance catch a violator in the zone we have selected." That may be so, and again it may not be so, because under this sampling method it

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

could always turn out that in the selected zone everything was all right; the entire 100 per cent of declared armaments had actually been presented for destruction. But a number of rockets might still remain in each of the other eight or nine zones. What would you do then? You would then say that you had received information that a certain number of rockets had been retained in another zone, but we would then say to you: "Well now, you adopted the zonal method; you have carried out verification in that zone; everything there is all right; we will not allow you into another zone."

So how does it work out? What is the good of this zonal method in the case of 100 per cent elimination of any particular type of armaments? It gives no assurance whatsoever. It creates, I would say, a false illusion that everything is apparently all right, that on the basis of the random sampling method you found everything in that zone as it should be. Therefore, from the point of view of ensuring 100 per cent elimination of any particular type of armaments the zonal method does not provide any assurance, nor does it provide any assurance even from the point of view of 30 per cent destruction. Why? Because you carry out verification in one zone or in three zones out of nine, but even if you do so in three zones out of nine, it is still only a third and in each of the zones of the other two thirds there may still be a number of rockets. But you yourself say that this is of tremendous importance for the defence of a country in view of the danger of an attack with these few but powerful rockets. Therefore it seems to me that this method provides no assurance of effective verification.

That is one aspect of the matter. There is another aspect, namely what does this method offer from the point of view of those who are interested in obtaining first-hand information on the military potential of a country? Well, from this point of view the zonal method offers quite a lot. Indeed, in a zone covering, say, one-ninth or one-tenth of a country, and in the case of the Soviet Union this would be a very large part of the country, in fact a territory equal to several European States, you would get to know in detail all the types of armaments existing there and the system of communications between the different types of armaments, because you would see how the troops are deployed and what the proportion is between the various kinds of troops in that area; you would see the defence system in that area;

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

in other words you would in fact find out the defence system of the whole country because, even though it is only one zone, it is a zone which you have selected. I think that your Joint General Staff of the three types of armed forces is not so incompetent that with all the re-shuffles which you are carrying out, there are not to be found in it a good many capable generals. I am quite sure of that. We can be quite certain that they will select the zone in which your General Staff is particularly interested. They will select for verification the zone that suits them best, the zone where there is the greatest concentration of the main types of armament, where nothing is known about how these types of armaments are located and so forth. I think that we ought not to overlook this. Well, after this selection and after having entered and explored the zone from one end to the other together with all the specialists in the corresponding types of armaments, you will of course get a general idea of the overall defence system of the country.

That will be the actual situation. What does it mean? It means that you will obtain an idea of the entire system of defence of the country as typified by one zone, and this while 90 per cent of the means of delivery and 100 per cent of nuclear weapons are still in your hands. Now tell us honestly: is it possible for any country which may expect a nuclear attack by you to agree to this type of verification? Let us approach this matter sensibly, so to speak, and --- I am loath to use such a crude expression --- without demagogy: can a country accept such a method of verification, which would enable others to ascertain in one-tenth of the whole territory of a country the defence system of that country, to ascertain its basic types of armament, while at the same time it has no guarantee that 90 per cent of the whole system of armaments at the disposal of the other side cannot be put into operation after this verification and in conditions where 100 per cent of nuclear weapons are retained?

I do not know whether you are willing to approach these questions in a reasonable, businesslike manner or, as Mr. Godber said, in depth, but you cannot ignore these obvious facts which follow from your proposal which you have just explained to us in detail. That is why we say that the zonal principle is a dangerous one for any country that may expect a nuclear blow on the part of another State, whereas the principle which we propose in no way involves any danger to you.

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

In what way would it involve any danger? We say: as regards the first two elements of verification, about which Mr. Dean has spoken today, namely verification of what is to be destroyed and verification of production, there are no differences between us. I would go even further and say: in the agreed articles of the draft treaty we have already provided for much of what Mr. Dean mentioned. Look at paragraph 4 of article 2 of the text of the treaty (the working draft which we have submitted) -- we have an agreed paragraph 4. This agreed article reads:

"To provide for (a) co-operation with the Organization by the Parties to the Treaty; (b) implementation within their territories of all its control measures set forth in Parts-----of the present Treaty; and (c) submission by them to it of such information about their armed forces, armaments, military production and military expenditure as is necessary to carry out the measures ..." (ENDC/40/Rev.1, p.4).

That is to say, we provide for the declaration of everything about which Mr. Dean has spoken today. If we provide for the total elimination of the means of delivery in stage I, it means that we must submit information regarding all means of delivery. Furthermore, we must afterwards verify on the spot, in the depots and at the places where these means of delivery are located, whether they actually correspond to the quantities which we have declared to you. So that is an already agreed part of our treaty. There is no dispute about that. Then what are we arguing about?

The dispute is about something else. You say that it is essential to propose the zonal method of verification. It is true you said this morning that these zonal proposals are not necessarily the complete answer to the problem and if there are defects in them we should let you hear about them. So I tell you that there are serious defects in this method of selective zonal inspection. To sum up, there are two defects: the first is that it does not guarantee the effective verification of the 100 per cent elimination of any type of weapon; there is absolutely no such guarantee. Secondly, it discloses the defence system of the other country and the system of all types of armaments possessed by that country. In these circumstances what is the value of this method of zonal inspection? We are outspoken people and we say straight out that it is worth nothing, because we cannot accept such a method in the form in which you are proposing it; in the first place, it provides no real guarantee of verification and secondly, it does not afford a country which fears aggression the possibility of avoiding such aggression.

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

Such a method is no good. On the other hand, it is very good precisely for those who are interested in discovering as quickly as possible the defence system of another country and all its types of armaments right from the very beginning of the disarmament process. Yes, it is very good for this purpose. And I believe this method was devised in the United States military establishments which are interested precisely in this.

However, we cannot accept such a method. If you can prove the contrary, I am prepared to listen; but I think that the arguments I have put forward today are weighty enough.

On the other hand, what we propose we consider to be more suitable. First we propose 100 per cent elimination of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles in stage I, and secondly, we propose 100 per cent verification of this elimination.

At the last meeting Mr. Cavalletti said, on the one hand, that we should submit some concrete proposals and, on the other, that the Soviet Union did not explain anything (ENDC/PV.67, p.55). Mr. Godber also complained that the Soviet Union did not explain anything and so forth (*ibid.*, p.15). But, in the first place, I have given explanations today and, in the second place, we have done so more than once.

Mr. Cavalletti -- I am sorry that he is not here, but his friends will, of course, tell him what I have been saying -- asked the Secretariat to prepare a summary of our statements on this question. We do not think there is any need to burden the Secretariat with this sort of work which each delegation can carry out for itself. However, if the Italian delegation has not sufficient resources for this, and if it can only put questions and not answer them, then we are prepared to meet the wishes of Mr. Cavalletti and to help him out of his difficulty by reminding him of the most important declarations made by the Soviet delegation on this question, without burdening the Secretariat with work which does not pertain to it and which is moreover of an artificial and obviously one-sided nature.

Indeed, why does Mr. Cavalletti propose compiling a summary of the statements of the Soviet delegation and of the delegations of the socialist countries? Why? Then let us have a summary of all the statements made on this question. This would, so to speak, facilitate matters for everyone; it would then be possible to get an

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

objective picture of what has been said on this question. But what does this entail? It entails looking through all the records. But what have all of us been doing here? Or can it be that Mr. Cavalletti does not look through the records? We, all of us, look into the records; that is how we work. I think that all the other delegations also work in the same way. Why does Mr. Cavalletti not want to engage in this work? Has he other business which is more important?

But, as Mr. Cavalletti has also charged us with not explaining everything clearly, I shall take the liberty of reminding him of a few things. I hope I may be excused for taking up quite a lot of time today, but it seems to me that nevertheless there has been some benefit from my explanations and from my assessments of what has been said. It seems to me also that everyone now has a clear enough idea of what our position is and of what the weak points in the position put forward by the United States are. Nevertheless, I will remind you of what we said in the past.

At the second meeting of the Committee of the Eighteen Nations on 15 March 1962 (ENDC/PV.2, p.7), the Soviet Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Gromyko, submitted to the Committee for consideration, together with our draft treaty on general and complete disarmament (ENDC/2), a memorandum of the Soviet Government (ENDC/3). This memorandum is also in the possession of the Italian delegation and they can look into it and see a great deal on the problems about which they have been putting questions to us. In section III of this memorandum it is stated:

"The appropriate articles of the draft Treaty provide that the International Disarmament Organization will have adequate means and facilities for the establishment of control over the elimination of rocket weapons, military aircraft, warships, submarines, and other means which may be used as nuclear weapons vehicles. To these ends the draft Treaty provides for the presence of international inspectors during the destruction of all types of delivery vehicles,

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

at airfields and in ports, and during the destruction of rocket launching sites. At the same time international control is to be instituted over those enterprises which were previously engaged, wholly or in part, in the production of the means of delivering nuclear weapons, in order to prevent the clandestine resumption of their production." (ENDC/3, p.9)

That is to say, what I have been telling you today was already stated basically in this document and you could have read it for yourselves. It continues:

"These control measures will embrace all the processes of the elimination of nuclear weapons delivery vehicles, and will provide for access by the International Disarmament Organization, and its inspectors, to objectives essential for purposes of effective verification, and will ensure that no-one will be able to evade compliance with his obligations in respect of a specific disarmament measure." (ibid. p.10)

You will find all this in the document -- I am saying this, in particular, for the benefit of the Italian delegation -- in document ENDC/3.

On 16 April, the Soviet delegation once more explained how it envisages the establishment of control over the elimination of all means of delivering nuclear weapons (ENDC/PV.21, pp.32 et seq.) On 11 May 1962, the Soviet delegation returned once more to this question and emphasized -- I quote our statement of 11 May -- that:

"Controllers will be present at all places where the means of delivery of nuclear weapons are being eliminated ... "

"Control would cover not only missile storage depots or places where aircraft are stationed, but also missile launching pads. Controllers will be able to inspect plants engaged wholly or partly in producing nuclear weapon delivery vehicles." (ENDC/PV.35, p.57)

On 14 May, we gave further details of control over the implementation of the elimination of the means of delivering nuclear weapons. We said:

"In the case of fixed installations, for instance, enterprises engaged in the production of military equipment that is to be destroyed or eliminated, launching pads, rockets, etc., inspection and control must be carried out where these installations are located. In the case of movable installations, the Soviet delegation believes that we should

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

simply agree on the most rational procedure for controlling them. It may prove far more convenient to transfer some types of military equipment to specific localities for destruction rather than to destroy them on the spot. It is quite obvious that the actual process of destruction may require the use of some industrial capacity; instead of reducing rockets, aircraft, etc., to scrap metal in the places where they are located, for example, in depots or at airfields, it may therefore prove more rational to transfer them to specific localities where it would be easier to destroy them." (ENDC/PV.36, pp.37, 38)

This, in my opinion, does not differ from what Mr. Déan said today.

The Soviet delegation dealt with these questions also at many other meetings of the Committee. We have stated quite clearly and we continue to state that the Soviet Union is prepared to agree to the 100 per cent verification of the 100 per cent elimination of means of delivery of nuclear weapons. We proceed from the premise that for such 100 per cent verification international controllers and inspectors will of course have to be present at the rocket launching sites, aerodromes and other units connected with the launching and, in general, with the putting into action of nuclear weapons. We declare ourselves in favour of the presence of international inspectors at the places where the means of delivery of nuclear weapons actually existing in the various States are to be destroyed. We are in favour of international control at all plants producing rockets, aircraft and other means of delivery of nuclear weapons, and also at all places where the means of delivery are stored.

We take a firm stand on the position that strict international control must be exercised in stage I over implementation of the measures laid down in article 14 of our draft treaty, such as the prohibition of placing into orbit or stationing in outer space of any special devices capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction, the leaving of their territorial waters by warships, and the flying beyond the limits of their national territory by military aircraft capable of carrying weapons of mass destruction.

We have said many times, and we repeat, that the Soviet Union considers it essential, from the very first stage of general and complete disarmament, to establish international control over the launchings of rockets and space vehicles for peaceful purposes. We propose for this purpose the setting up of control

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

teams at the sites for the launching of rockets for peaceful purposes, who will be present at the launching and thoroughly inspect each rocket or satellite before it is launched.

What more do you want? What further guarantees are required in order that all the parties to the treaty should be mutually convinced that each of them is carrying out its obligation to destroy the means of delivery of nuclear vehicles in stage I? As the representative of Czechoslovakia, Mr. Hajek, correctly noted at our last meeting, an additional guarantee of this would be "the sufficiently speedy rate of implementation of disarmament measures" (ENDC/PV.67, p.23). This is precisely one of the reasons why we are in favour of short time-limits for implementing all the measures of the first stage of general and complete disarmament, although we also express our readiness to seek for mutually acceptable solutions to this problem. We are in favour of short time limits, not because we are in any hurry, but because this is the best way to arrange things in order to achieve the actual implementation of general and complete disarmament.

Now allow me to put the question from another angle. If the Western Powers are not satisfied with out concrete proposals for eliminating the means of delivery of nuclear weapons and for control over their destruction, why do they not submit their own proposals on this subject? The Western Powers seem to speak in favour of eliminating the means of delivery of nuclear weapons, if not in one stage, at least in three stages. How do they envisage control over such complete elimination? Moreover, how do they envisage control to ensure in the first stage of disarmament when, according to their plan, there is to be a 30 per cent reduction of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles, that States carry out this obligation to the letter and do not retain, let us say, more rockets or aircraft than are provided for by the plan of the Western Powers? What Mr. Dean has told us today about the way they envisage this matter does not provide any guarantee, but gives definite advantages to those who are interested in aggression.

On 6 and 8 August, the representative of Canada, Mr. Burns, tried to explain to us how the Western Powers envisaged such a system of control (ENDC/PV.66, pp.19 et seq. and ENDC/PV.67, pp. 43 et seq.); but it is obvious that his views in this regard, in the first place, are politically unacceptable and, secondly, are completely unfeasible in practice.

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

What is the trend of Mr. Burns' proposals? If we understood him correctly -- and at the meeting of 8 August he tried very hard to preclude any possible misunderstanding of his views -- it appears that the Canadian representative suggests that, even before we start to destroy one single rocket, one single submarine, one single bomber, one single atomic gun, international controllers should be instructed to scour every nook and cranny in the territories of all the countries in the world, in order to find out whether there were not somewhere some hidden stockpiles of means of delivery or clandestine plants for their production, apart from those declared by the States.

What can we say about such a search on a world-wide scale? For the NATO intelligence services such a system of control would of course be a real godsend. No spy satellite, no military intelligence agency is capable of guaranteeing such complete information on the whereabouts of the other side's military objectives as would be given by such a system of control. However, this can be desired only by those who are working out plans for nuclear attacks against the territory of the Socialist countries, by those who are aiming not at disarmament, but at obtaining information on the location of our defensive equipment. With all due respect to Mr. Burns, and notwithstanding the fact that we feel sure he is himself a man of peace and would probably like to help bring about an agreement on disarmament, we are bound to say that this proposal of his cannot possibly serve the interests of disarmament. It is impossible to accept it, because the acceptance of such a proposal would be tantamount to giving up ensuring the elementary interests of the security of peace-loving States. Moreover, as we have said before, the point is not only that Mr. Burns' proposal is politically unacceptable; it is also completely unfeasible in practice. There is no X-ray apparatus capable of penetrating through entire countries -- countries which are considerably larger than let us say, Luxembourg. If we followed Mr. Burns' suggestion in this respect we should have to operate, so to speak, by hand, in a rough and ready manner, and one can imagine what a colossal number of men would be necessary and how many millions of dollars would have to be spent on such a fantastic control system, besides which such an undertaking could barely be completed in the lifetime of one generation. But is it not self-evident that this is utterly unreasonable and unrealistic, not to use stronger terms?

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

It is not without reason that the English newspaper, The Daily Herald, of 9 August -- that is, yesterday -- commenting on the statement made by the representative of the United Kingdom, Mr. Godber, in this Committee on 8 August (ENDC/PV.67, p.6), noted the contradictions which that speech contained. Referring to Mr. Godber's assertion that verification of the destruction of means of delivery of nuclear weapons is in fact impossible, that newspaper said -- I quote this English paper for the information of the United Kingdom representative

"If Mr. Godber is right on the issue of the destruction of rockets in the first stage of disarmament, the same must apply with regard to the destruction of rockets in the second stage, as suggested by the West."

It is impossible not to agree with this reasonable conclusion which the English newspaper has drawn. It is obvious that in spite of everything there are reasonable people in England.

Moreover -- this newspaper states -- the words of Mr. Godber concerning the difficulties of control can be applied also to other types of weapons, including nuclear weapons. Here again The Daily Herald is right; it is not a Government paper, of course, but that does not make it any the less sensible.

What is the conclusion to be drawn from all this? The conclusion is that the essence of our disagreement with the Western Powers does not lie in the details of control. The essence of our disagreement concerning means of delivery of nuclear weapons lies in our different fundamental approach to the measures of disarmament in stage I and to the programme of disarmament as a whole. We wish to carry out the elimination of means of delivery of nuclear weapons, and moreover in the very beginning of the disarmament process, as a first guarantee against nuclear attack. But you want something different. What is it you want? Your proposals for stage I show quite definitely that, under the pretence of implementing measures for reducing the means of delivery of nuclear weapons, you want to bring about a strategic situation which might make it easier to carry out the peace-threatening plans of certain circles in the West. This, moreover, could not be denied by the representatives of the United States and the other Western Powers -- they did not even seriously try to deny it.

You representatives of the Western Powers do not like it when we remind you of the existence of such plans and when we quote statements by responsible statesmen

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

of the United States which cannot be assessed otherwise than as a call to start a preventive nuclear war. You pretend that these statements mean nothing. However, we quote statements made, not by casual strollers in the street, nor by immature strategists from the cafés and hairdressing saloons, but by the people in whose hands you have concentrated control of the button which would unleash a nuclear war. Those statements create very natural concern; they put us on our guard and they compel us to reflect over and over again on the meaning of your proposals in regard to the means of delivery of nuclear weapons.

Accept our proposal for the complete elimination of all means of delivery of nuclear weapons in the first stage, and then it will be possible to believe that the Western Powers really wish to eliminate the basis for a preventive nuclear war. Accept our proposal, and then it will be easier to reach agreement both on other issues and on the specific proposals which you put forward.

The Soviet delegation would like to take advantage of the present occasion when the Eighteen Nation Committee is now completing its discussion on the question of disarmament measures in regard to the means of delivery of nuclear weapons in the first stage, to address this appeal once more to the delegations of the Western Powers.

I take it that next week, after we have discussed the question of the discontinuance of nuclear tests -- which, as Mr. Dean has already mentioned, we have arranged to discuss on Tuesday -- we can instruct the co-Chairmen to examine the possibility of reaching agreement on the corresponding articles of the first stage of the treaty on general and complete disarmament which deal with the questions of means of delivery.

It seems to me that the discussion which has taken place until today has been sufficiently full -- I would even say thorough. It had depth, although the meaning of this deep study was not quite the one that was mentioned by the representative of the United Kingdom. But that is where we differ: we consider that to study a matter in depth means to study it according to its substance, to study the issues which really arise. That is what we have tried to do, but it does not mean that we should necessarily study also papers which side-track the matter or which do not deal with the fundamental issues which face us.

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

Such a study seems to us at present quite inappropriate and not in accordance with the interests of our task. It seems to us that we have considered all the main issues in sufficient depth and that the time has now come for the two co-Chairmen to start examining the specific articles of the treaty and to try to find a way of bringing our respective positions closer. It is clear, however, that in view of the United States' present attitude on the question of the elimination of means of delivery, it will not be possible for us to bring our positions closer on that main issue. We express the hope, however, that the United States and the other Western Powers will carefully consider all the arguments we have put forward, all the additional explanations which we have furnished, including those given also at today's meeting, and we hope they will be in a position to revise at least to some extent their attitude on this important question of stage I of disarmament.

We consider this to be the fundamental question of the first stage of disarmament, because one must start disarmament with measures which would immediately bring about a new situation in the world and which would show at once, both to all the participants in the discussion and to the world, that we wish to eliminate the most terrible danger existing in the world today -- the danger of a nuclear war breaking out.

It is our deep conviction that the fundamental, drastic measure of eliminating all means of delivery of nuclear weapons would give us such security. The possibility of implementing this measure is beyond dispute; control over its implementation is fully possible. I think that what we have explained today will convince the members of the Committee of this even more fully.

Mr. GODBER (United Kingdom): I had intended to intervene this morning only for a few minutes just to say a word or two about the draft article 4 (ENDC/55) our two co-Chairmen put before us the other day; but I should like, when I have dealt with that, to say a word or two about the very interesting speech to which we have just listened. I would say straight away that I welcome the very reasoned tone in which a great deal of it was delivered.

(Mr. Godber, United Kingdom)

The draft of article 4 has been submitted to us by our co-Chairmen and I think we should thank them for the work they have done in relation to it. We are all naturally interested to study the results of their labours and to note the number -- or the absence, in different places -- of the brackets which seem to be causing us a good deal of difficulty. I felt from the start that we could not get very far with this particular article until we had discussed the major issue of substance in depth, and so I would have thought that possibly the draft which we have before us could well have been accepted for the present, on the same basis as other drafts of previous articles.

My first criticism of it, however, is really a criticism of our United States co-Chairman, and I hope he will forgive me. I see that after the heading "Part II - Stage I. Article 4 - Basic Tasks and Obligations and Time Limit of Stage I" it goes on to say: "During Stage I the parties to the Treaty, in accordance with the provisions of Articles _____ through _____, ...". I take exception to that particular phrase, because I see from the heading at the top of the document that this is an English original. Well, it is not an English original. It may be American, but it is not English. The word "through" in that context is not an English word as used in English. We would use the word "to" rather than "through". I do not stress that as a basic difference between my United States colleague and myself: I merely bring it forward for clarification.

With regard to the major points of difference, of course, as I have said, I do not think we are going to resolve them at this stage and we shall undoubtedly have to come back to this article when we have been through stage I. I was a little puzzled, however, in relation to paragraph 4, in which the word "disarmament" appears within double brackets. I tried to think of the reason for the intention to insert that word. I think it must be, as our United States colleague said, for some purpose to reduce the effectiveness of the paragraph. It seems to me that if one is going to say "to ensure verification in the agreed manner of the obligations undertaken" those are obligations undertaken in the treaty. Surely we want to ensure that all those obligations are honoured, therefore why include the word "disarmament" there? It must be all the obligations, whether they relate to specific disarmament measures, to questions of verification, to the setting-up of the international disarmament organization or to the peace-keeping forces. All those matters seem to me to be obligations, and all the items in the treaty must be taken as a whole. Therefore I hope that there will be no intention to

(Mr. Godber, United Kingdom)

maintain this word "disarmament" because, of course, we do know that our Soviet colleagues attach to "disarmament" a particular meaning which is not common, I think, to the general concept of the word as we in the West look at it. We look at "disarmament" as describing the whole process, whereas they look at it as actual elimination of armaments, having no bearing on what remains at a particular time. So it may be that the word has a particular significance in that connotation. But I hope in any case that it can be removed at some later stage.

As for the final paragraph, it seems to me that that is the best compromise that could be reached at the present time, with, of course, the major difference between the two sides on the question of time. This again, I hope can be ironed out when we have decided on the actual measures which we are going to carry through. As I have always said, I have never felt tied to a particular time until I see the processes that have got to be carried through and see what time would in fact be reasonable for carrying them through. In other words I am willing to be convinced, if people can show good reason, that the time could be somewhat shorter than that proposed in the Western plan; but at present it seems to me that ours is a reasonable time and it depends on what proposals are finally agreed upon in relation to this.

The other major points of difference, as I said, have clarified themselves only too well for us, and I do not think there is any need to dwell on them. Therefore I presume we will accept this draft on the same basis as we have accepted the others and allow it to go forward with our other draft articles, which are starting us on the long road towards the completion of a treaty.

Now I should like to say just one word about what our Soviet colleague was talking about this morning. He made a most interesting speech which I shall certainly want to study with the greatest care, because for the first time -- if I may say so -- he has really appeared seriously to study the zonal inspection idea and has put forward his thoughts in relation to it. That is helpful. I wish he could have done it before, because we must tackle and consider these various proposals together, and if he will explain his doubts and difficulties to us, as he has done this morning in very reasoned terms, it does help us, I think, to understand his fears in relation to them, and perhaps we can between us help to iron those fears away. Of course there is still the fact that, having said that he could not accept

(Mr. Godber, United Kingdom)

this, he has not given us any satisfactory alternative; but perhaps he will offer that in due course. It is a very difficult problem and we all recognize that; we have all recognized it from the start. It is a problem that is basic to the whole issue.

Mr. Zorin sought to explain to us how we could proceed with the verification procedures in relation to the Soviet draft plan. He was kind enough to remind us of the wording in the Soviet draft plan (ENDC/2) in articles 5, 6, 7 and 8, and those words in relation to inspection with which I think that we are all familiar. Those words are very good as far as they go, but we have always made it clear that we are not satisfied -- and without further explanation we cannot be satisfied -- that they go far enough. That really is the point of difference between us here. That is where we have the problem. Our Soviet colleagues tell us, as Mr. Zorin told us again this morning, "You can visit the plants, you can visit the emplacements and you can verify everything there." That was in relation to his proposal for 100 per cent elimination of the nuclear delivery vehicles in the first stage. I think I have quoted one of the phrases which he used. Then he said that, because of that, we could have complete confidence. Of course, what he did not say is that so far he has never told us that, in connexion with 100 per cent elimination, he would allow us to visit not only the places where the Soviet Union tells us that these things are, not only the places where the Soviet Union tells us these machines of death are produced -- not only the factories -- but any place that the inspectors of the international disarmament organization might choose because they believed that some such thing was hidden away. That is where we have not had any clear guidance from the Soviet Union. But of course that is the basic difficulty -- that possibility of clandestine hiding of weapons, or clandestine production of weapons, which is a very major point in this whole problem, and it applies to nuclear delivery vehicles just as it applies to anything else. That is where we have to have some help from the Soviet Union.

It was in relation to that, of course, that the zonal inspection plan was suggested. It was put forward as a suggestion, and there could be many variants of it. I was interested in the speech of the representative of the United States this morning which did seek to set out some of the ways in which it could be developed, and I still hope that we can have serious discussion between the two sides, and with the participation of non-aligned countries, of just how it could be worked out in practice. Obviously, it is not a cut and dried plan; but it is a principle round which a plan could be built, and one which, in my view, could provide the security which both sides want.

(Mr. Godber, United Kingdom)

The Soviet Union representative made certain criticisms of it which rather made me wonder whether he had fully understood the proposal, because he talked about its being impossible to verify 100 per cent under the zonal inspection scheme. Of course, under the zonal inspection scheme, and under a plan similar to that put forward by the United States, we would progressively go forward to the 100 per cent inspection as we went progressively forward with the disarmament process. As the end of the first stage was reached, according to the United States proposal, there would be 30 per cent reduction of armaments and there would be 30 per cent verification, and by the time 100 per cent elimination had been reached there would be 100 per cent inspection, because, while certain zones would be inspected at a particular time, having inspected them, we would have to leave a residue of inspectors in one zone when we moved on to inspect the next zone.

Thus, gradually, a situation would be built up in which, in every country concerned, there would be not only an intensive examination during the period of inspection but, subsequent to that, a sufficient number of persons remaining to see that the territory did not in fact have a lot more armaments poured back into it. Therefore, by the time the 100 per cent elimination had been reached we would have the 100 per cent inspection, and the job would have been done over a sufficiently long period to give confidence that it had been done thoroughly and well. The representative of the Soviet Union told us once before that it would be a tremendous task. It would be a tremendous task, but done in this way, gradually and with inspectors going from one area to another but still leaving a residue behind, the field could be covered in due course. Therefore I fail to understand the representative of the Soviet Union when he says that, under the zonal inspection scheme, 100 per cent elimination could not be guaranteed. I would say that it could be guaranteed a great deal better than if, in a short period of time, masses of inspectors who previously had had no experience, and had a new job to build up, were suddenly disgorged on a particular territory and, in the very first stage, sought to ensure 100 per cent verification in relation to a particular type of armament.

Of course, as I pointed out previously, the Soviet Union representative has not really faced up to the problem involved by his proposal for 100 per cent elimination of one type of armament and yet, at the same time, a much lower percentage of other armaments. As I understand the position of the Soviet Union, it would not be

(Mr. Godber, United Kingdom)

prepared to give complete freedom over the whole of its territory to inspectors in those circumstances because that would expose those other armaments to what the Soviet Union representative would describe as espionage.

Therefore, it seems to me that the position still remains that, under the zonal inspection scheme, as I understand it, there would be the opportunity to build up an effective position until, at the end of the day, we would have that real 100 per cent inspection, that 100 per cent verification and, I would believe, 100 per cent confidence with it. But the Soviet Union representative tells us that under his scheme we could have greater guarantees. I am afraid that I just do not understand that, and I would ask him to explain to us more fully on another occasion just how in fact he would achieve it. It is a serious problem between us, as I have said. I have suggested in the past that there should be special experts working on this problem, but nevertheless I do, as I say, welcome the way in which our Soviet colleague has seriously tried today to enter into discussion of this difficult problem.

As for the zones themselves, the United States representative made it clear this morning that there could be either a small number of large zones or a large number of small zones, and I think that that deals with the point which Mr. Zorin made when he talked about the generals -- they are always NATO generals -- who would select the zone of greatest interest to them. The whole point, as I understand it, is that when territories have been split up into nine equal parts -- or whatever it may be -- the home country would be the one which split up its country into zones. It would split it up in such a way as to give equality of war potential in each zone. That could be either in the nine zones or in ninety zones; and if it were ninety zones, presumably one critical zone would be married up with several very much less critical zones. The international disarmament organization would then choose this group of small zones, which would cover possibly one critical one with a number of others less critical. But it would be for the country which was to be inspected, I think, to have the opportunity -- and this is a matter which I would wish to discuss in detail at some time -- of forming a decision on the way in which its country might be split up. There is this safeguard against abuse of that opportunity by any country: the fact that the choice of zone would lie either with the international disarmament organization or with the other side, however it is decided. Therefore no country

(Mr. Godber, United Kingdom)

would wish to have the one area to be inspected at one time -- whether it were one contiguous zone or a number of small zones -- more vulnerable than others. Therefore there is an impetus to force forward any country to see that all the choices which it makes are roughly equal, and thus the degree to which a country may suffer from espionage could never be over-great in regard to the choice of any particular area. Those are the sort of complicated issues which I should think we could discuss, as I have said, in other ways.

These are, of course, just a few immediate reactions and comments on the very interesting speech to which we have listened, but I think it would be wrong of me to seek at this moment to give any final views in relation to it. It is a speech which deserves the greatest care and study, and I hope that it does presage a new attempt on the part of our Soviet colleagues to discuss these serious matters seriously with us, and to let us get down to discussion of them in depth.

I should like just to take up one small point which our Soviet colleague made (supra, p. 39) when he quoted an English newspaper, The Daily Herald, to us in regard to my speech of two days ago. Unfortunately The Daily Herald, having to rely on certain reports, had its facts wrong in this regard. It had understood that I had said that verification of 100 per cent destruction was impossible. What I said, of course, as I am sure our Soviet colleague remembers, is that verification of 100 per cent destruction would be impossible in the first stage -- which is a very different matter. Now, I can excuse The Daily Herald for getting it wrong, because it had to study the reports it received, but I find it difficult to excuse my Soviet colleague for getting it wrong because he had the immense pleasure of listening to me personally, and the only assumption I can draw is that he may have fallen asleep at that particular point in my speech. That, I would very much regret, but I would suggest that he rely on his own hearing and that of his colleagues and, if he likes, on the verbatim record, and not necessarily always on The Daily Herald, which is not a paper which is always absolutely right. So I leave that point there and suggest that he sticks to what I actually said and not to some newspaper report which was not strictly correct.

I apologize if I have spoken a little longer than I had intended. I just wanted to deal with those few points immediately, but I shall, as I say, welcome the opportunity of studying in more detail the important speech which we have heard from our Soviet colleague this morning.

Mr. DEAN (United States of America): I shall be very brief. I listened with the greatest of interest to what our Soviet colleague had to say this morning, but with regard to his suggestion that discussion on paragraph 5(b) should be closed today I submit that that is perhaps premature by at least one plenary meeting. I am sure that all representatives will be thrilled to know that I have one further statement to make on paragraph 5(b), and in part I shall want to devote it to a study of and, I believe, response to some of the very interesting comments made by Mr. Zorin today. Other delegations might also have something more to say, and I therefore suggest that we should continue and -- I hope -- conclude discussion on paragraph 5(b) on Wednesday. But there is one further statement that I should like to make on paragraph 5(b) on Wednesday.

Mr. LALL (India): I also shall speak very briefly. One reason why I should like to make these remarks today and not at our next meeting is that I wish to say that the delegation of India listened with great interest to the statements made today by the co-Chairmen, both of whom spoke at some length on very important matters. We thought that the response which Mr. Zorin made to Mr. Dean's statement gave us hope that a serious effort to reconcile different points of view and a serious endeavour to make progress in the field of general and complete disarmament with adequate measures of verification and control have now been embarked upon, and we hope that our co-Chairmen will come closer together and will endeavour to understand each other's points of view on the very important issues which were raised in the two speeches.

There is another important matter which I wish to touch upon, and it arises out of document ENDC/55, read together with the United States document of 8 August (ENDC/30/Add.2) which set out certain amendments on transition measures. First, may I say that we were glad that, in document ENDC/55, the co-Chairmen had been able to arrive at a certain measure of agreement and that the brackets on that page did not appear in every single item. That in itself is a measure of progress and we are glad to note it. We should like to say that in our view the brackets could come off some of the other phrases, and we hope that the two co-Chairmen will make every effort -- and indeed we would urge them to do so -- to reach further compromises on article 4 of our draft treaty.

(Mr. Lall, India)

I believe it was in that connexion that the United States delegation also presented its paper on transition measures. We should like to see some changes made in that paper, and we should like to suggest them to our United States colleagues. In particular, in paragraph 1(c), which now reads "All militarily significant States had become parties to the treaty", we should like to add the words "and had carried out all the undertakings of stage I". It is the general view of the delegation of India that all militarily significant States must become parties to the treaty on general and complete disarmament in stage I and that the measures of stage I must be carried out by all such States. We feel that unless we aim at a provision of this character this treaty of ours will be greatly delayed and will not achieve a world-wide character for a long time, and that would not be in the interests of world peace and security. We should like to suggest this addition as being an important one.

I should like in this connexion to turn to paragraph 7 of document ENDC/55. The first sentence under the bracketed portion states that "Stage I will begin upon the entry into force of the Treaty, in accordance with Article _____". I do not think that the blank there has reference to the question of adherence to the treaty by States, but I should like to mention here at this stage that, at the appropriate time, the delegation of India will make suggestions regarding adherence to this treaty so as to ensure that the widest possible adherence will be enjoined upon all States in the very first stage. That is our view and, as I have said, we will make certain suggestions to ensure its consideration. I would like to give notice of that view at this stage, however, because we feel that stage I measures should not be restricted simply to a few States but that the interests of large parts of the world, in Asia and elsewhere, should be taken into account and that balanced disarmament should be promoted in those parts of the world from the earliest possible stage. India is a peace-loving country not just in word, and we should like to see in our part of the world implementation of a treaty on general and complete disarmament from the very beginning.

Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian):

I should like to make just two short remarks, the first of which concerns what Mr. Godber said about The Daily Herald. I quoted The Daily Herald as follows:

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

"If Mr. Godber is right on the issue of the destruction of rockets in the first stage of disarmament, the same must apply with regard to the destruction of rockets in the second stage ..."

Therefore, what The Daily Herald wrote was that Mr. Godber was saying that destruction is not possible in stage I. But The Daily Herald said that if this is impossible in stage I, then it is just as impossible in stage II. Therefore, in my opinion, The Daily Herald correctly perceived the gist of Mr. Godber's position. I am very glad that The Daily Herald criticizes Mr. Godber's position and clearly understands the gist of it. Here our criticism coincides with that of The Daily Herald.

My second remark is on the question of when we should conclude our discussions of item (b). Of course, I have no grounds for objecting to Mr. Dean's giving further explanations on these questions on Wednesday and availing himself of the opportunity to answer certain points made by me today. Therefore I have no objection. But it seems to me that in order to organize our work better we might perhaps agree this morning that all the delegations which wish to submit additions, amendments or proposals concerning item (b) should do so by Wednesday. Then on Wednesday we will have completed the whole process of discussing paragraph 5(b) and we could then pass on to item 5(c).

If the representative of the United States has no objections, perhaps we might decide accordingly: that by Wednesday 15 August all the delegations should submit any amendments or proposals they may have bearing on the draft articles covered by paragraph 5(b).

Mr. DEAN (United States of America): Mr. Zorin's suggestion is quite acceptable to us.

Mr. GODBER (United Kingdom): The representative of the Soviet Union is obviously very interested in The Daily Herald, and I note that fact with interest. I wondered therefore whether he would like to arrange for The Daily Herald to be made freely available to his countrymen in the Soviet Union, because at present it is not allowed to be sold publicly there. I suggest that he might like to take that up.

The Conference decided to issue the following communique:

"The Conference of the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its sixty-eighth plenary meeting at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of the representative of Brazil.

"Statements were made by the representatives of Bulgaria, the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and India.

"The next plenary meeting of the Conference, which will be devoted to the consideration of the question of a nuclear test ban treaty, will be held on Tuesday, 14 August 1962, at 10 a.m."

The meeting rose at 1.15 p.m.

